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In this entry, you will find a short reflection on the relationship between language and philosophy, and my fears about whether or not, because of the former, we can ever hope to learn anything substantial from the latter.
One of the go-to tools of a philosopher is the distinction.
A distinction, whether made by a philosopher or not, is a method of demarcating concepts and guarding against conflation and confusion. For example, when I say that there is a fundamental difference between statements like “that Spanish woman is dancing” and “you should dance with that Spanish woman”, I make a distinction.
The difference between these statements or the reason for this difference is among the things I am trying to get at with my distinction. For example, in this case, I have drawn a distinction between these two sorts of statements in order to suggest that there are at least two kinds of statements in the world and that they have different natures, functions, or purposes. The first statement is descriptive, in that it is describing matters of fact in a neutral way; while the other is prescriptive (or normative), in that it attempts to guide action and present some form of an idea or norm — i.e. what we should do.
Without becoming distracted by the example, I will simply say that in drawing distinctions we are trying to discover something beyond the concepts — something fundamental to the world. The idea is that this distinction within our language reveals something deeper about our world.
A failure to make good distinctions, it has often been thought, leads to confusion. Take as another example these two passages from the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein writes,
“3.323 In the language of everyday life it very often happens that the same word signifies in two different ways—and therefore belongs to two different symbols—or that two words, which signify in different ways, are apparently applied in the same way in the proposition. Thus the word “is” appears as the copula, as the sign of equality, and as the expression of existence; “to exist” as an intransitive verb like “to go”; “identical” as an adjective; we speak of something but also of the fact of something happening. (In the proposition “Green is green”—where the first word is a proper name and the last an adjective—these words have not merely different meanings but they are different symbols.)
3.324 Thus there easily arise the most fundamental confusions (of which the whole of philosophy is full).”
Here Wittgenstein, among other things, points out that there are at least three distinct ways in which the word “is” can function.
(1) As the copula — as that which links subject and predicate like “The man is tall”.
(2) As the sign of equality, as in “2 plus 2 is 4”.
(3) As the sign of existence, as in “I am that I am”.
These are good distinctions, and some of the most perplexing philosophical puzzles have arguably been generated by failing to make them. One such example is, according to Kant, the confusion within Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. Many years later, Quine had much to say on how we ought to use the word “is” in order to avoid confusion.
I still believe in Philosophy, and I employ such distinctions in this philosophical manner; but I, just like the later Wittgenstein, have fears that such distinctions are far-too limited by the language in which they appear and that nothing fundamental is really being signaled at. I have the creeping fear that we are just blabbing on about our own language and nothing more; which would reduce philosophy to, as Russell said, “at best, a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-table amusement.”
To see where this worry comes from, consider the following philosopher, let’s call him Saaz, who wants to suggest something about the human personality by drawing a distinction between the expressions “to like” and “to love”.
To Saaz, there is something expressed about the human personality by our separating these concepts of “love” and “like”(what he is aiming at is here an irrelevancy). But now imagine Saaz drawing this distinction in the presence of a native Spanish speaker.
In Spanish, they use (among others) the words “gustar”, “querer”, and “amar” all to signify a form of romantic attraction. The meanings of these verbs can be loosely mapped onto English equivalents (“gustar” = like, “querer” = second-degree love, and “amar” = first-degree love), but they are simply not the same, and this “distinction” that Saaz draws between “like” and “love” would make little to no sense in Spanish, where the “distinction” would be, at least, between three verbs and not of the same sort.
How can a distinction be used to learn something about our world if it is so limited by the language itself?
This fear — that all of our subtle argumentative and philosophical maneuvers merely reveal things about the way we use our language — continues to terrify me.
The importance of language is philosophy is certainly not subject to question. The question is: how far does this importance go? How much of what we are doing is real, and how much is just verbal gymnastics with no prize at the end?
Returning to our first example, can we really make the distinction between “normativity” and “description”? Is such a distinction fundamental to the world or merely an expression of our language?
At this point, I remain uncertain of the implications of this linguistic reduction of our critical thinking. It could be true that there is a way to circumvent the powerful barriers of language; or, it could be true, with the most extreme implications, that
5.6 Los límites de mi lenguaje son los límites de mi mundo

