Thomas More: . . . You’re a heretic.
Roper: I don’t like that word, Sir Thomas.
Thomas More: It’s not a likable word; it’s not a likable thing.
A Man for All Seasons, by Robert Bolt

Today I was reading a legal complaint where the author used the term “unsheltered persons” instead of the more familiar, “homeless people.” A quick google search indicated, quite unsurprisingly, that a whole social movement existed behind this linguistic choice. Other suggested terminology included “houseless persons.” This called to mind another, similar instance of this phenomenon from my own life.
When I was a kid, the word “retard” was already a bad word. We were told to use the word “special” to refer to people with mental disabilities. At that time, I had no idea that words such as idiot, imbecile, and moron were formerly used as clinical words that at some point met the same fate as “retard.” A decade or so later, when I became a high school teacher, I noticed that in the U.S., the term “special” had been displaced by the new, more fashionable term, “exceptional.” The needs of these students were addressed by the “exceptional students services center.” More extreme examples appear at every turn. Consider how our grandparents might have said “colored people,” only to be told a few decades later that they should instead say “person of color” to avoid being offensive.
Most of us are familiar with this process, and examples certainly do not lack. Many, especially older people who have lived through several of these linguistic phases, view them with understandable vexation. Each time one of these shifts occur, however, we are assured that the adoption of the new term is something that simply must be done. It’s simply time to retire the old term and adopt a new one, they say. Interestingly, not enough thought goes into why–on an individual, psychological level–proponents of these linguistic revolutions are so insistent upon doing so. At times, there may be larger, more legitimate or insidious political motives behind these language campaigns, but I don’t want to focus on that. I think there is an interesting psychological explanation as well. Put simply, once a term used to describe an undesirable thing exists for long enough, it acquires itself a visceral undesirability–one that reflects the nature of the object of the term and which makes certain users of it uncomfortable–thus making the shift to a new, connotation-free term an attractive mechanism for psychological relief. Let me briefly develop this thesis before exploring whether any alternatives to this process exist.
- If a term describes something undesirable for long enough, it acquires a visceral undesirability itself
Being homeless, mentally disabled, or a prostitute is hardly an ideal state of affairs. So, after enough years of people–in real life, books, and movies–using these terms to refer to people with these qualities, the terms themselves appear undesirable. This is because we recognize the thing itself as undesirable. We know that we would not like to be without a home, or with severely diminished mental faculties, or forced to have sex with people for money. After enough semantic saturation, we tend to experience the word “prostitute” itself–the cadence of its letters and vowels–in a visceral way, as if by saying it we were looking into a filthy, dimly lit home and seeing a sad and emaciated woman performing sexual acts for money. In doing so, we essentially allow the word to blend with the thing, allowing ourselves to be “bewitched by our language” as Wittgenstein might say. Faced with such ugly words–words made ugly by our individual, psychological act of allowing the word to adopt the quality of the thing in itself–we opt to make a change.
- By coining a new term to refer to undesirable things, we satisfy our own psychological desire to avoid the ugliness that these words have acquired.
Ultimately, we–or at least those who often table-thump in favor of retiring problematic language–elect to do so because they feel icky when they say the words. By doing so, they sprinkle moral brownie points upon themselves for “progressing” by avoiding a “problematic” term, when in reality, they are simply avoiding unpleasantness and yet doing nothing to alleviate the actual, underlying problems. Why solve the homelessness crisis when you can get the same moral high, the same dopamine hit, from merely calling these people “unhoused persons.” I’d rather be called a bum by the man who ladled my food. Furthermore, this unpleasantness we feel is itself caused by our psychological habit of allowing a term to acquire visceral power. In some cases, in fact, this might actually be a good thing. Why would we not want an undesirable thing to have an undesirable word? I am not sure it benefits us to trade “whore” or “prostitute” for “sex worker,” or “pedophile” for “minor-attracted person.” Society needs the opprobrium. Furthermore, the Orwellian dangers of obfuscation at the societal level are well known. It should not matter if such obfuscation is conducted in the name of some confused linguistic moralism.
On the other hand, perhaps periodic shifting of terms might sometimes be a good thing. The case of those with mental disabilities presents a possible example, since terms here refer to an innocent class of persons with a defect that they have no control over. So, if we are all unable to stop our psychological habit of allowing the word to blend with the thing, then perhaps a frequent refreshing of terms might be the charitable thing to do. Like buying new jeans when the old ones wear out.
It seems that every day we are given a new term that needs to be retired for some reason or another. Most people–those with memory of the past or who simply still have access to their own common sense–intuitively recognize these periodic shifts as absurd. The source of the absurdity, however, is often not as clear. I think these movements are absurd because they lead to a continual and endless cycle of lexical fatwas that are motivated by individual psychological discomfort rather than legitimate moral reasons and are probably harmful because they satisfy our desire to be nice at the cost of removing our motivation to do good. And, in some cases, they serve as dangerous tools of obfuscation that strip society of its powerful ability to maintain moral order through shame. Perhaps, instead of a cyclical crusade against terms, we should look within ourselves to avoid the psychological habit of association that is responsible for making the term feel ugly. Perhaps we should simply force ourselves to recognize that a prostitute is not the same thing as “prostitute.” This, however, might be impossible–and in some cases, as I have said, undesirable. But when it is in fact inevitable, we should proceed without histrionics and without self-righteousness, being honest with ourselves that in almost all cases, those employing the dirty, old word probably just haven’t allowed it to become ugly to them. We should also be honest with ourselves, recognizing that we probably only want to hide behind a clean, connotation-less word because we want to avoid discomfort and ride a cheap moral high that demands nothing of us .









